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Abstract
We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues,
which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model
in which office and policy motivated politicians vote in favor or against reg-
ulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip
flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their
∗This paper builds on our earlier project circulated under the title “Guns and Votes.”
We wish to thank seminar participants at various institutionsfor their comments and
suggestions. We are also grateful to Alberto Alesina, Micael Castanheira, Ernesto dal
Bo, Mirko Draca, Allan Drazen, Matthew Gentzkow, Steve Levitt, John List, Dilip
Mookherjee, Jim Snyder, Noam Yuchtman, two anonymous referees, and various seminar
and conference audiences for helpful comments. We are also indebted to Michael Blanga-
Gubbay and Alisa Yusupova for excellent research assistance. Funding from the FNRS
and from the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies is gratefully acknowledged.
1
terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they ap-
proach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators’ votes on
gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with the model’s
predictions, we find that i) election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Demo-
cratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators; these
effects arise for senators who ii) are not retiring, iii) do not hold safe seats,
and iv) represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate
size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity does not affect votes
on reproductive rights, due to the presence of single-issue minorities on both
sides.
JEL classifications : D72, I18, K38, Q00.
Keywords : Electoral incentives, Environment, Gun control, Reproductive
Rights.
1 Introduction
Passion often runs high in politics. Within an electorate, some individuals feel so pas-
sionate about a particular issue that they are willing to cast their votes based on a
candidate’s stance on that issue alone. For instance, some voters may be concerned
mostly with politicians’ stance on reproductive rights, others with their position on gun
control, environmental regulations, or LGBT rights.
Single-issue voters often seem to have disproportionate power relative to their size.
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A striking example is provided by gun rights supporters in the United States. In the
wake of the murder of twenty children and six staff at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
December 2012, opinion polls showed that 90% of Americans were in favor of an expan-
sion of background checks on gun purchases. However, the 10% who opposed these gun
controls got its way in April 2013, when the Senate failed to pass the Manchin-Toomey
amendment to strengthen background checks. Even after the more recent mass-shootings
in Las Vegas in October 2017 (which left 58 people dead and hundreds wounded) and
at a high school in Florida in February 2018 (in which 17 people were killed and more
than two dozen others were wounded), new gun controls have little chance of success in
Congress, notwithstanding support from the vast majority of Americans.
In this paper, we examine how single-minded minorities can shape politicians’ deci-
sions on three policy issues: gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. There
are three main reasons for focusing on these issues. First, they are prototypical sec-
ondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about.1 Based on Gallup
surveys carried out between February and December 2017, less than 0.5% of respondents
ranked abortion as the most important problem facing the country; the corresponding
shares for gun control and environment are less than 2% and 3%, respectively.2
1In the literature, List and Sturm (2006) mention environmental policy and gun
control as “typical examples of such secondary policy issues”, while Besley and Coate
(2008) mention gun control or abortion as examples of policy issues that are salient to
minorities of voters.
2By comparison, more than 20% considered Dissatisfaction with government/Poor
leadership as the most important problem; the shares for Health and Immigration were
around 10% and 8%. Earlier Gallup surveys confirm the secondary nature of our three
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Second, there are key differences between these issues. Two of them are dominated
by a strong minority on one side: in the case of gun control, gun-rights supporters be-
longing to organizations like the National Riﬄe Association (NRA) or Gun Owners of
America (GOA) dominate an apathetic majority who favors tighter regulations;3 in the
case of the environment, there is a minority of “green” voters belonging to organizations
like Greenpeace or the National Wildlife Federation, but no single-issue “brown” minor-
ity.4 By contrast, in the case of reproductive rights, there are two opposite single-issue
minorities of similar size and intensity: some individuals are strongly pro-choice and
belong to organizations such as the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League (NARAL); others are strongly pro-life and belong to organizations such as the
National Right to Life (NRLC).
policy issues in earlier decades. Based on surveys carried out in 1977, 1987, 1997 and
2007, the share of respondents ranking environment as the most important problem was
always less than 3%, while the corresponding shares for gun control and abortion were
never above 1%. We thank Jerry Hansen for providing us with these data.
3As pointed out by Goss (2006), there is a “missing movement” for gun control in
America: in terms of number of members and intensity of their preferences, gun-control
groups like the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence pale in comparison to gun-
rights groups.
4Voters often dislike environmental regulations. For example, a Gallup poll in 2017
asked whether environmental protection should be given priority at the risk of curbing
economic growth, or if economic growth should be given priority even if the environment
suffers a bit; 35% of respondents stated that economic growth should be given priority.
However, voters who are against environmental regulations tend to oppose taxation and
regulation more generally, rather than being focused on the environment.
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Third, as discussed below, our identification strategy relies on variation in voting
behavior across and within U.S. senators. These legislators often vote on regulations
related to gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. For other secondary policy
issues, legislation is mostly at the state level or through the courts.5 Moreover, for
the three issues we study, we can rely on lists of relevant congressional votes provided
by corresponding single-issue organizations (Gun Owners of America, the League of
Conservation Voters, and National Right to Life Committee).
We focus on one channel through which single-issue voters can shape politicians’
choices: the intensity of their policy preferences. The broad idea is that politicians only
respond to the interests of voters who make them accountable on a policy issue. Going
back to the example of gun regulations, after the Senate voted against the Manchin-
Toomey amendment on background checks, President Obama asked: “The American
people are trying to figure out: How can something have 90% support and yet not
happen?”. His answer was that the 90% who support gun controls lack the passion and
focus of the 10% who oppose them: “Ultimately, you outnumber those who argued the
other way. But they make sure to stay focused on this one issue during election time.”6
5In the case of Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights, for example,
Massachusetts was the first U.S. state to legalize same-sex marriage in 2004. It was
followed by 36 other states, until same-sex marriage was legalized at the federal level
through a Supreme Court decision in June 2015.
6Single-mindedness is key to understand the power of the National Rifle Associations
(NRA). “The NRA is considered by many the most powerful lobbying group in the
country, despite relatively modest financial resources and just 4 million members. (. . . )
The NRA focuses almost exclusively on gun control, which enables its leaders to doggedly
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An alternative channel through which vocal minorities could affect policy choices
is money. Politicians may be willing to support policies favored by special interests
in exchange for their financial support. However, relatively little money is actually
paid to politicians on secondary policy issues such as gun control, environment, and
reproductive rights. The amount of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions
related to these issues pales in comparison to what is spent on other policy issues, such
as Finance/Insurance, Health, or Construction.7
We develop a simple theoretical model to study how single-issue minorities affect
pursue their legislative ends. Perhaps more important, many NRA members are as
single-minded as the organization itself. Polls often show that more Americans favor
tightening gun control laws than relaxing them, but gun rights advocates are much
more likely to be single-issue voters than those on the other side of the question. As a
result, the NRA can reliably deliver votes” (see “Why is the NRA so powerful? How the
gun lobby leverages modest resources into outsized influence,” Slate, June 29, 2012).
7The data on lobbying expenditures and campaigns contributions come from the
Center for Responsive Politics. As shown in Figures C-1, C-2, and C-3 of the Online
Appendix, spending on the three secondary issues of interest represents a tiny fraction of
the spending on other policy issues, both in terms of lobbying expenditures and campaign
contributions. For example, expenditures related to reproductive rights are only 0.5%
of those on Finance/Insurance and Health, and less than 5% those on Construction;
expenditures on gun regulations and environmental regulations are respectively 2% and
3.5% compared to expenditures on Finance/Insurance or Health, and 19% and 31%
compared to expenditures on Construction. Looking at campaign contributions to U.S.
congressmen, spending on the three single-issues represents around 1.5% of the spending
on Finance/Insurance, 3% of spending on Health, and 7% of spending on Construction.
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politicians’ choices on secondary issues. Politicians serve two-period terms, at the end
of which they face re-election. During their mandates, they are called to vote in favor
or against regulations on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. They care
about remaining in office, but also have their own policy preferences, which may reflect
their party line on these issues. The three policy issues are only salient to minorities of
pro-issue or anti-issue voters.
We derive conditions under which politicians will change their voting behavior dur-
ing their terms in office. In our model, politicians who face a tradeoff between policy
preferences and re-election motives may “flip flop”, voting according to their preferences
at the beginning of their terms and in line with the preferences of a single-issue minor-
ity when they are close to facing re-election. Election proximity should instead have
no impact on the voting behavior of politicians who share the same preferences as the
single-issue minority.
Our model predicts heterogeneous effects across secondary issues. This is because
the relative strength of single-issue minorities, which depends on their size and pref-
erence intensity, varies across issues. As argued above, in the case of gun regulations,
the pro-gun minority is stronger than the anti-gun minority. In the case of environ-
mental regulations, the pro-environment minority is stronger than its anti-environment
counterpart. Finally, in the case of regulations on reproductive rights, there are two
equally strong minorities of single-issue voters, one pro-life and one pro-choice. Election
proximity should thus have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect on the voting behavior
of politicians who are in favor of (against) gun regulations (environmental regulations);
it should instead have no impact on politicians’ voting behavior on reproductive rights.
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The model also predicts that election proximity should have no effect on politicians who
are retiring or hold safe seats, as they do not face a tradeoff between policy preferences
and re-election motives. Moreover, politicians should only flip flop when the single-issue
minority is neither too small nor too large.
To assess the evidence, we examine the determinants of U.S. senators’ votes on
regulations on gun rights, the environment, and reproductive rights. The staggered
structure of the U.S. Senate — in which senators serve six-year terms and one third
of them is up for re-election every two years — provides a quasi-experimental setting
to verify whether election proximity affects the decisions of incumbent politicians. For
any given vote, we can compare the behavior of senators who belong to three different
“generations,” i.e. face elections at different times.8 We can also study whether election
proximity affects the stance of individual senators over time, exploiting the fact that
senators cast multiple votes on the same issue during their terms in office.
We have assembled a novel dataset that allows us to link senators’ voting behavior
on the three policy issues of interest to a wealth of characteristics of the legislators and
their constituencies. To identify the relevant votes to be included in the analysis, we
8This strategy builds on a vast literature that examines the impact of election prox-
imity on legislative behavior (e.g. Amacher and Boyes, 1978; Thomas, 1985; Glazer
and Robbins, 1985; Levitt, 1996; Bernhard and Sala, 2006). Rather than focusing on
senators’ choices on specific policy issues, most of these papers analyze how election
proximity affects senators’ ideological positions, captured by summary indexes of their
voting record on a broad set of issues (e.g. ADA scores, D-Nominate and W-Nominate
scores). Other studies compare senators’ voting scores to measures of their constituen-
cies’ preferences and examine how election proximity affects the gap between the two.
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rely on lists of votes assembled by single-issue organizations.
The empirical results provide strong support for the model’s predictions. First, we
show that senators flip flop on gun control and environment — the two issues domi-
nated by a strong single-issue minority: election proximity increases the likelihood that
Democratic senators vote pro-gun and that Republican senators vote pro-environment.
In the case of reproductive rights, election proximity has not effect on the behavior of
senators: Democratic senators vote pro-choice, while Republican senators vote pro-life,
in line with their own preferences and with the interests of the single-issue minority on
the same side. We next show that these effects do not arise for senators who are retir-
ing or hold safe seats, and are thus not concerned about losing office. Finally, election
proximity has a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect on Democratic (Republican) senators
only when the pro-gun (pro-environment) group in their state is of intermediate size.
Our findings contribute to the debate about the shortcomings of voting as a way
to keep politicians accountable. It has been argued that, in representative democracies,
voters are limited in their ability to make politicians accountable for their policy choices.
This is because citizens have only one vote to punish or reward politicians on a bundle
of issues (Besley and Coate, 2008). Electoral accountability has thus no bite, especially
for policy issues that are of secondary importance to most voters. Contrary to this
argument, List and Sturm (2006) emphasize the role of electoral incentives in shaping
U.S. governors’ choices on state-level environmental regulations, which are of secondary
importance to most voters. They argue that electoral incentives still matter in the pres-
ence of single-issue voters, who base their voting decisions solely on the policies related
to their specific issue of interest. Our paper shows that electoral accountability driven
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by single-issue voters is a widespread phenomenon, which spans other policy issues and
other levels of policymaking. Our theoretical model and empirical findings show that
electoral incentives are a key determinant of national choices on gun control, environ-
ment, and reproductive rights. Rather than responding to the median voter, politicians
are accountable to different single-issue minorities of voters on different policy issues.
Because they see the policy space as unidimensional, these minorities keep politicians in
check and shape their policy choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly outline our
theoretical model. Section 3 presents our main empirical results. The last section
concludes. In the Online Appendix, we discuss the related literature in more details
(Section A), present the full version of the theoretical model (Section B), and describe
the data and variables used in our empirical analysis (Section C, which also includes
additional results).
2 Theoretical Framework
In Section B of the Online Appendix, we develop a simple model of politicians’ choices to
help structure our empirical analysis. We build on standard probabilistic voting models
(e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1982; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995;
Grossman and Helpman, 1996, Persson and Tabellini, 2001, and Stromberg, 2004). We
focus on the decisions of an incumbent, who serves a mandate lasting two periods, with
elections taking place at the end of the second period. The incumbent is both policy
and office motivated and in each period she is called to vote on three policy issues: gun
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control regulations, environmental regulations, and regulations on reproductive rights.
As discussed in the introduction, a key feature of these policy issues is their “secondary”
nature, i.e. the fact that the majority of the electorate does not care intensely about
them. To reflect our empirical analysis, we consider the three issues separately (i.e. in
each period, the incumbent votes on one piece of legislation related to each policy issue).
The model delivers three propositions. Proposition 1 characterizes the behavior of
an anti-issue incumbent. It shows that election proximity can only have a pro-issue
effect on such an incumbent, and that she flip-flops only when the pro-issue minority in
her constituency is of intermediate size. Proposition 2 characterizes the behavior of a
pro-issue incumbent. It shows that election proximity can only have a anti-issue effect
on such an incumbent, and that she flip-flops only when the anti-issue minority in her
constituency is of intermediate size. Proposition 3 shows that an incumbent who is not
affected by re-election incentives (either because she is retiring or because she holds a
safe seat) never flip-flops.
To map these propositions into empirical predictions, we will examine the impact
of election proximity on the voting behavior of U.S. senators on regulations concerning
gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. As discussed before, the staggered
structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and one third is
up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of different
generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
In terms of voters’ preferences, we will work under the following assumptions, justi-
fied above: (i) the pro-gun minority is substantially larger than the minority in favor of
gun regulations (i.e. 4gun < 0 in the model) ; (ii) the pro-environment minority is sub-
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stantially larger than the anti-environment minority (i.e. 4env > 0); and (iii) there are
no substantial size or intensity differences between the pro-life and pro-choice minorities
(i.e. 4repr ' 0).
We also need a proxy for the policy preferences of incumbents (i.e., ω (s) in the
model). To this purpose, we assume that senators’ policy preferences reflect their party
line: Republican senators are pro gun, opposed to environmental regulations, and pro
life, while Democratic senators are pro gun control, pro environment, and pro choice.
As discussed in Section B of the Online Appendix, a large body of literature finds
that politicians from the same party tend to vote similarly, either because politicians’
with similar preferences select into the same party or because parties use rewards and
punishments to influence their members’ voting behavior (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal,
1985 and 2007; Krehbiel, 1993; Levitt, 1996; Ansolabehere et al. 2001; McCarty et al.,
2001). These findings suggest that party affiliation can be used as a proxy for senators’
policy preferences. The assumption that Republicans are more likely to be pro gun,
anti environment and pro life (and conversely for Democrats) is in line with previous
studies reviewed in Section A of the Online Appendix on US congressmen’s votes on gun
regulations (e.g. Langbein and Lotwis, 1990), environmental regulations (e.g. Nelson,
2002), and reproductive rights (Washington, 2008). It also finds support in our data on
roll-call votes on these issues.9
Propositions 1 and 2 lead to our first testable prediction:
9Based on our samples of votes, Republican senators are around 42 percentage points
more likely to vote pro-guns, 38 percentage points less likely to vote pro-environment,
and 72 percentage points more likely to vote pro-life than Democratic senators.
12
Prediction 1. Election proximity should increase the likelihood that Democratic sen-
ators vote pro-gun and that Republican senators vote pro-environment; it should have
no effect on the voting behavior of Democrats and Republicans voting on reproductive
rights.
In the model, incumbents flip flop when they face a tradeoff between their policy
preferences and their re-election motives. Notice that measurement error in our proxy
of incumbents’ policy preferences works against us, making it harder to find support
for Prediction 1. To see this, take the example of gun control and suppose that some
Democrats are actually pro gun and some Republicans are actually anti gun. Contrary
to Prediction 1, Republicans should then be the ones to flip flop (since they face a trade
off between their true policy preferences and their electoral incentives), while Democrats
should vote pro-gun throughout their terms in office.
Proposition 3 suggests that senators who are not concerned about re-election – either
because they are retiring of because they hold safe seats – should not flip flop, voting in
line with their policy preferences throughout their terms in office. This result leads to
our next testable predictions:
Prediction 2. Election proximity should not have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect
on the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators who are retiring.
Prediction 3. Election proximity should not have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect
on the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators who hold safe seats.
Propositions 1 and 2 highlight the ambiguous effect that the size of the single-issue
minority can have on the flip-flopping behavior of incumbents. For example, consider np,
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the size of the pro-issue minority. Proposition 1 shows that, when np is either sufficiently
small (condition (ii) is satisfied), or sufficiently large (condition (iii) is satisfied), an anti-
issue incumbent does not flip flop. In the former case, she always vote against the issue,
while, in the latter case, she always vote in favor. It is only when np is of intermediate
size (condition (iii) is satisfied) that the incumbent flip flops. This means that np has
a non-monotonic effect on incumbents’ incentives to flip flop. Similarly, Proposition
2 shows that na, the size of the anti-issue minority, has an ambiguous effect on the
flip-flopping behavior of a pro-issue politician. This leads to our last testable prediction:
Prediction 4. Election proximity should only have a pro-gun (pro-environment) effect
on the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when the pro-gun (pro-
environment) minority in their state is of intermediate size.
3 Empirical Methodology and Results
To assess the validity of the model’s predictions, we have assembled a novel dataset
that allows us to link U.S. senators’ voting behavior on each policy issue to a wealth
of characteristics of the legislators and their constituencies. We describe our data in
Section C.1 of the Online Appendix).
We follow two complementary strategies to identify the effect of election proximity on
senators’ voting behavior. First, we exploit variation in the voting behavior of different
senators, depending on which generation they belonged to at the time of the vote.
Second, we exploit changes in the voting behavior of individual senators over time.
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3.1 The impact of election proximity, party differences
To assess the validity of Prediction 1, we estimate the following linear probability model:
Voteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it ×Democratit
+λ2 Senate12it × Republicanit + λ3 Senate3it × Republicanit
λ5 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δj + δt + ijvt. (1)
The dependent variable is Voteijvt, which is equal to 1 if senator i from state j votes
pro issue (i.e. pro gun, pro environment or pro choice) on vote v in year t. The main
regressor of interest is Senate3it, the dummy variable for the third generation of senators,
identifying legislators who are closest to facing re-election. For ease of exposition, we
combine the first and second generations of senators into one omitted category, i.e.
Senate12it.
10 Democratit and Republicanit are dummy variables taking the value of 1 if
a senator i belongs to the Democratic or Republican party in year t, respectively.11 In
these regressions, we cluster standard errors at the state level.
According to the first prediction of our theoretical model, whether or not senators
flip flop should depend on the issue under consideration and on their party affiliation.
In the case of gun regulations, election proximity should increase the probability that
10The qualitative results are similar if we only include first-generation senators in
the omitted category, although some of the coefficients of interest are less precisely
estimated, as we lose statistical power (in particular for votes on gun regulations, for
which the number of observations is much smaller).
11In Section C.4 of the Online Appendix, we show that results remain unchanged if we
drop senators who change party, and therefore both dummy variables are time-invariant.
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Democratic senators vote pro gun; λ1 should thus be positive and significant, while
λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3 for gun-related votes. When it comes
to environmental regulations, election proximity should instead increase the probability
that Republican senators vote pro environment; λ1 should thus be insignificant, while λ2
and λ3 should be negative and significant, with λ3 significantly smaller than λ2. Finally,
election proximity should have no impact on senators’ voting behavior on reproductive
rights, because of the presence of intense minorities on both sides of the issue; λ1 should
thus be insignificant, and λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3.
The matrix Xit includes additional controls for legislators (e.g. gender, age), and
Wjt is a matrix of state-specific characteristics (e.g. crime rate, education). In our
benchmark specifications, we also include two sets of fixed effects: δj are state dummies,
capturing time-invariant characteristics of constituencies that may affect senators’ voting
behavior (e.g. rural); δt are year dummies, which allow us to account for year-specific
variables (e.g. share of Democratic senators in Congress). In alternative specifications,
we replace the year dummies with vote dummies or add interactions between state and
year dummies. Notice that, when we include these interactions, we identify the effect of
election proximity based on differences in the voting behavior of senators from the same
state in the same year. This allows us to account for changes in state-level preferences
on a given issue due to a local shock (e.g. a shooting rampage).
When we estimate (1), we identify the effect of election proximity exploiting variation
in the voting behavior of different senators, depending on which generation they belonged
to at the time of the vote. This identification strategy relies on the staggered structure
of the Senate. This guarantees that, at any point in time, a third of legislators are close
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to facing re-election (i.e. whenever a vote is cast in the Senate, a third of members
belong to the third generation).
Still, one might be concerned that the timing of the votes could be correlated with
characteristics of the senators who belong to the third generation. For example, votes on
gun control may always be timed so that some Democratic senators are close to facing
re-election. If this is the case, a positive correlation between belonging to the third
generation and voting pro gun may be driven by selection effects in the timing of the
votes rather than by the impact of election proximity (although the inclusion of year
or vote dummies alleviates these concerns, allowing us to control for the composition of
the Senate at the time of the vote).
Our second empirical strategy allows us deal with this concern, exploiting variation
in the voting behavior of individual senators over time to identify the effect of election
proximity. This strategy relies on the fact that senators usually serve for long periods of
time and cast several votes on each policy issue while belonging to different generations.
In this case, if the results confirm our model’s predictions, they cannot be driven by
selection effects in the timing of the votes: if the votes on a particular policy issue were
always timed so that some particular senators are close to re-election, we should not find
any evidence of flip-flopping when relying only on within-senator variation.12
12Further reassurance against the endogeneity of the timing of the votes comes from
regressing the number of votes on gun and environmental regulations in a given congress
against the number or share of Democratic and Republican senators running for re-
election in that congress. The results of these regressions show no significant cross-party
differences.
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We estimate the following linear probability model:
V oteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it ×Democratit
+λ2 Senate12it × Republicanit + λ3 Senate3it × Republicanit
λ4 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δi + δt + ijvt, (2)
where δi are senator dummies. In these regressions, we cluster standard errors at the
senator level. The interpretation (and expected signs) of the key variables of interest are
the same as for model (1): for votes on gun control, λ1 should be positive and significant,
while λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3; for votes on environmental regu-
lations, λ1 should be insignificant, while λ2 and λ3 should be negative and significant,
with λ3 significantly smaller than λ2; for votes on reproductive rights, λ1 should thus be
insignificant, and λ2 should not be significantly different from λ3.
Tables 1-3 present the results of estimating models (1) and (2) for each of the three
policy issues. The specifications in each table differ in terms of the regressors and
fixed effects included, or the econometric methodology employed, but all provide strong
support for the first prediction of our model. Focusing on the key regressors, we see
that the estimated coefficients λ1, λ2 and λ3 match the expected sign and significance.
To save on space, in Tables 1-3 we only report the coefficients of our key variables of
interest (see Tables 1-3 in Section C.3 of the Online Appendix for a longer version of
these tables, which includes the coefficients of the auxiliary controls).
The estimates in Table 1 confirm that Democratic senators are more likely to vote
pro gun as they approach re-election (the coefficient of the interaction variable Senate3it
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× Democratit is always positive and significant). By contrast, Republican senators do
not change their voting behavior during their terms (the test at the bottom of the table
is never significant). These results are in line with our prediction that the presence of
a strong minority of gun-rights activists can make Democrats vote against their own
preferences when they are close to re-election.13
[Table 1 about here]
In terms of magnitude, the effect is very stable across specifications. When comparing
across senators, Democrats are between 7.0 and 8.5 percentage points more likely to vote
pro gun in the last two years of their mandates. This effect is slightly larger (i.e. around
10 percentage points) when we only exploit variation in the voting behavior of individual
senators over time. As expected, Republican senators are significantly more likely to vote
pro gun, but their behavior does not change as they get closer to re-election.
Table 2 reports the results for votes on environmental regulations. As expected,
Democratic senators do not change their voting behavior over time (the coefficient of
the interaction Senate3it × Democratit is never significant). By contrast, Republican
senators are more likely to vote pro environment when they are close to re-election: the
estimated coefficient λ2 and λ3 are both negative and significant (i.e. Republican sena-
tors are less environmentally friendly than Democratic senators), but the coefficient of
13Senator Tom Harking (D-IA) provides an example of a Democrat who flip flopped
on gun control: he cast 11 votes on gun-related legislation (4 in the 105th Congress, 4 in
the 106th, 1 in the 109th, 1 in 110th, and 3 in 111th) and only voted pro gun once during
the 110th Congress (in 2008), the only time in which a vote occurred when he belonged
to the third generation of senators.
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the interaction term Senate3it × Republicanit is significantly smaller in absolute terms
than the coefficient of Senate12 × Republicanit (see the test at the bottom of the table).
These results are in line with the first prediction of our model: when it comes to en-
vironmental regulations, only Republican senators face a tradeoff between their policy
preferences (which lead them to vote against regulations at the beginning of their terms)
and their re-election motives (which lead them to vote in line with the preferences of
the green single-issue minority at the end of their terms).
[Table 2 about here]
The estimates of Table 2 imply that election proximity increases the probability of
Republican senators voting pro environment by between 1.7 and to 2.2 percentage points
(when comparing across senators) and by between 1.3 and 1.4 percentage points (when
exploiting only within-senator variation).14
When it comes to votes on reproductive rights, the evidence in Table 3 is again very
supportive of the first prediction of our theoretical model. In the case of regulations
related to reproductive rights, no politician should face a tradeoff between policy pref-
erences and re-election motives, due to the presence of strong pro-choice and pro-life
minorities. We would thus expect senators of both parties to vote according to their
policy preferences throughout their terms. Indeed, the results in Table 3 show that
14Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO) provides an example of flip flopping on environmental
regulations: he voted pro environment only 10 times out of 108, and this happened during
the 105th Congress (when he belonged to the third generation), and in the 109th and
110th Congress (when he belonged to the second and third generation, respectively).
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Republicans are less likely to vote pro choice than Democrats (the coefficients of the
interactions Senate3it × Republicanit and Senate12 × Republicanit are negative and sig-
nificant), but election proximity has no significant impact on their voting behavior (in all
specifications, the coefficient of Senate3it × Democratit is very small and insignificant,
and concerning Republicans, the test at the bottom of the table is also insignificant).
[Table 3 about here]
Summing up, the results of Tables 1-3 confirm that election proximity has a pro-
gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators.
As expected, senators’ voting behavior on reproductive rights is instead unaffected by
election proximity. These results are identified by comparing the behavior of different
senators voting on the same legislation, as well as the behavior of individual senators
voting on different legislations.
In our analysis so far, we have allowed the party affiliation variable to be time
varying, given that a few senators in our sample changed from one party to the other
(Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Jim Jeffords, Richard Shelby and Arlen Specter), while
others switched from one of the parties to being independent (e.g. Joe Lieberman and
Bernie Sanders). We have verified that the results of Tables 1-3 continue to hold if we
drop from our sample the senators who switched parties (see Tables C-2, C-3, and C-4
in the Online Appendix). Compared to our benchmark regression, the main difference is
that we can no longer identify differences in parties’ stances on gun control, environment
and reproductive rights in the specifications that include senator fixed effects (columns
5-7). However, the results confirm the first prediction of our theoretical model: only
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Democratic senators flip flop on gun control, becoming more pro gun as they approach
re-election; only Republican senators flip flop on the environment, becoming “greener”
as they approach re-election; and election proximity does not affect votes on reproductive
rights by senators from either party.
3.2 Re-election motives
Having found strong support for the first prediction of our model, we now assess the
validity of the second and third predictions. These can be seen as placebo tests for the
idea that re-election motives – and the contrast with policy preferences – are the reason
why some politicians flip-flop.
We first use variation in the voting behavior of retiring vs. non-retiring senators to
verify whether re-election motives are the reason behind the flip-flopping documented
in Table 1 (for Democrats voting on gun control) and Table 2 (for Republicans voting
on environment). To assess the validity of Prediction 2, we focus on Democrats voting
on gun regulations and Republicans voting on environmental regulations and estimate
V oteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it × Not Retiringit
+λ2 Senate12it × Retiringit + λ3 Senate3it × Retiringit
λ5 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δj + δt + ijvt. (3)
The variable Retiringit takes the value of 1 for senators stepping down for exogenous
reasons (see the Online Appendix for details). Our theoretical model suggests that
λ1 should be positive and significant, as Democratic (Republican) senators seeking re-
22
election should become more pro gun (environment), while λ2 should not be significantly
different from λ3.
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions on gun votes for Democratic senators.
We find strong support for Prediction 2, as retiring Democratic senators do not flip
flop (see the test at the bottom of the table). The results also confirm Prediction 1:
the coefficient on the interaction term Senate3it× Not Retiringit is always positive and
significant and indicates that Democratic senators seeking re-election are between 8 and
12 percentage points more likely to vote pro-gun at the end of their terms.
[Table 4 about here]
Moving to the behavior of Republican senators on environmental policy, the results of
Table 5 show that only senators seeking re-election become “greener” at the end of their
terms: the coefficient of the interaction term Senate3it× Not Retiringit indicates that
non-retiring senators are around 3 percentage points more likely to vote pro environment
when they approach re-election. By contrast, retiring senators do not change their voting
behavior during their terms (see the test at the bottom of the table).
[Table 5 about here]
The results of Tables 4 and 5 are robust to dropping from our sample senators who
switched party. The results of Tables C-5 and C-6 in the Online Appendix confirm
that, as they approach the end of their term, Democratic senators become more pro gun
and Republican senators become more pro environment, but only if if they are seeking
re-election.
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We next assess the validity of Prediction 3. To verify whether election proximity has
no effect on the voting behavior of senators who hold safe seats, we estimate:
V oteijvt = λ0 + λ1 Senate3it × No Safe Seatit
+λ2 Senate12it × Safe Seatit + λ3 Senate3it × Safe Seatit
λ5 Xit + λ3 Wjt + δj + δt + ijvt (4)
The variable Safe Seatit takes the value of 1 when the vote difference between senator
i and the runner-up in the last election before year t was above the 90th percentile of the
vote margin distribution (see details in the Online Appendix). According to our model,
λ1 should be positive and significant, while λ2 should not be significantly different from
λ3. The results of estimating (4) are reported in Tables 6 and 7. In line with Prediction
3, they show that Democratic (Republican) senators who hold safe seats do not flip-flop
on gun control (environment): the p-value of the tests at the bottom of the tables is
never significant. By contrast, politicians who were elected with smaller margins do
change their voting behavior when they approach re-election, in line with Prediction 1:
Democratic senators become more pro-gun (the coefficient of the Senate3it × No Safe
Seatit in Table 6 is always positive and significant), while Republican senators become
greener (the coefficient of the Senate3it × No Safe Seatit in Table 7 is positive and
significant in all but one specification).
[Tables 6 and 7 about here]
The results of Tables 6 and 7 are robust to dropping senators who switched party.
The results of this robustness checks are reported in Tables C-7 and C-8 in the Online
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Appendix. As they approach the end of their term, Democratic (Republican) senators
become more pro gun (environment), but only if they do not hold safe seats.15
3.3 Heterogeneous effects across states
In line with the first two predictions of our model, the results presented in the two
sections above show that election proximity affects the voting behavior of senators on
secondary policy issues. As expected, Democratic (Republican) senators who are seeking
re-election are more likely to vote pro gun (pro environment) at the end of their terms,
while no senator flip flops on reproductive rights votes.
We next assess the validity of the fourth prediction of our model: Democratic (Re-
publican) senators should only flip flop on gun control (environment) when the size of
the pro-gun (green) minority in their constituency is neither too small nor too large.
We consider first gun votes. When looking at Democratic senators in our sample,
many are elected in states that are traditionally Democratic leaning, which have low
levels of per capita subscriptions to gun magazines (e.g. California and New Jersey).
However, others are elected in Democratic leaning states (e.g. Oregon or Vermont) and
traditionally Republican leaning states (e.g. Montana and North Dakota) with high per
capita subscriptions to gun magazines.
According to Prediction 4 of the model, Democratic senators should only flip flop
15The results of Tables 6 and 7 should continue to hold as long as the vote margin is
large enough for senators not be concerned about losing office. We have tried re-running
(4) using a lower threshold (85th percentile) of Margin of Victoryit to define safe seats.
The results continue to hold.
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on gun regulations when the size of the pro-gun minority in their constituency is of
intermediate size; in the alternative scenarios in which the pro-gun minority is smaller
(larger), they should always vote anti gun (pro gun). We would then expect an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the probability that a Democratic senator flip flops and
per capita subscriptions to gun magazines in his or her state. To verify this, we restrict
again our sample to Democratic senators and interact the variable Senate3it with Gun
magazine subscriptionsjt and its square term. Our theory suggests that the estimate for
the linear term should be positive, while the square term should have a negative sign.
The results reported in Table 8 strongly support the fourth prediction of our model:
the coefficient for the linear term is positive and significant, while the coefficient for the
square term is negative and significant. The test at the bottom of the table indicates
that Senate3it and the two interaction terms are jointly significant at 5%.
[Table 8 about here]
Figure C-7 in the Online Appendix provides a graphical representation of these results
in based on the specification of column 2 of Table 8. This figure shows the marginal
effects for Democratic senators belonging to Senate3it for different percentiles of the
distribution of gun magazine subscriptions. This allows us to illustrate how the impact
of election proximity on senators’ voting behavior varies with the size of the pro-gun
minority in their constituency. Notice that the marginal effects are not significant for
the lowest and highest percentiles of gun magazine subscriptions, confirming that election
proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators only when the size of the pro-gun
group in their constituency is of intermediate size.
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We next examine whether the impact of election proximity on Republicans’ voting
behavior on environment depends on the size of the green minority in their constituency.
To this purpose, we use data from List and Sturm (2006) on state-level membership in
the three largest environmental organizations (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and
the Sierra Club). We then interact the dummy Senate3it with the variable Membership
in Green Organizationsj and its square term.
The results are reported in Table 9. In line with Prediction 3 of our model, the
coefficient for the linear interaction term is positive and significant, while the coefficient
for the square term is negative and significant. The test at the bottom of the table
indicates that Senate3it and the two interaction terms are jointly significant at 1%.
[Table 9 about here]
Figure C-8 in the Online Appendix shows the marginal effects for Republican senators
belonging to Senate3it for different percentiles of membership in green groups, based on
the specification of column 2 of Table 9. The marginal effects are only significant for
intermediate percentiles, although the effect only becomes smaller and insignificant for
the top percentiles of membership in green groups. The results confirm that election
proximity has a “greening” effect on the voting behavior of Republican senators, but
only when the green minority in their constituency is of intermediate size.
We have verified that the heterogeneous effect of election proximity across constituen-
cies are not driven by senators who switched party. As it can be seen from Tables C-9
and C-10, even when dropping these senators, we find that the size of the single-issue mi-
nority has a clear non-monotonic effect on the probability that Democrats become more
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pro gun and Republicans become more pro environment as they approach re-election.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that minorities of single-issue voters can shape politicians’
choices on the issues that are salient to them. The key idea is that, when it comes to
secondary issues like gun control, environment and reproductive rights, office-motivated
politicians are only accountable to minorities of voters who care intensely about these
issues, knowing that the rest of the electorate will decide whether or not to re-elect them
based on their stance on other policy issues.
To capture this idea, we have described a simple model in which office and policy
motivated politicians are called to support or oppose regulations on gun control, envi-
ronment and reproductive rights during their terms in office. In this model, politicians
might flip flop, voting according to their preferences at the beginning of their terms and
in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities at the end of their terms. Elec-
tion proximity should affect politicians’ choices on gun control and environment, policy
issues dominated by strong minorities on one side (pro-gun and pro-environment). In
particular, as they approach re-election, Democratic (Republican) politicians should be-
come more pro gun (pro environment). Election proximity should have no impact on
the choices of Republican (Democratic) politicians on gun control (environment), since
they do not face a conflict between their policy preferences (or those of their party) and
their re-election motives. Similarly, Republican and Democratic politicians should not
flip flop on reproductive rights, a secondary issue characterized by strong minorities on
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both sides (pro-choice and pro-life). The model also predicts that the effects of election
proximity should only arise for senators who are not retiring, do not hold safe seats, and
represent states in which the single-issue minority is of intermediate size.
To assess the validity of these predictions, we have studied the voting behavior of
U.S. senators on legislation related to gun control, environment, and reproductive rights.
The staggered structure of the U.S. Senate, in which members serve six-year terms and
one third is up for re-election every two years, allows to compare the voting behavior of
different generations of senators, depending on how close they are to facing re-election.
We obtain three main results. First, as they approach re-election, Democratic senators
are more likely to vote pro gun, while Republican senators are more likely to vote in
favor of environmental regulations. As expected, election proximity has no effect on
senators’ voting behavior on reproductive rights. Second, Democratic (Republican) sen-
ators flip flop on gun control (environment), but only if they are seeking re-election (i.e.
not retiring). Finally, we find evidence of heterogeneous effects across states: election
proximity only affects the voting behavior of Democratic (Republican) senators when
the pro-gun (pro-environment) group in their constituency is neither too small nor too
large. Our results are robust to including a rich set of controls for legislators and their
constituencies, and exploiting variation both across and within senators.
These findings highlight that politicians systematically respond to the interests of
different single-issue voters on different secondary policy issues. The influence of these
voters across several issues gives credence to the argument that multidimensionality of
the policy space does not necessarily impair electoral accountability. Because single-issue
voters see the policy space as unidimensional, they can use voting to punish and reward
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politicians for specific policies, thereby keeping them in check. Instead of a tyranny of
the majority, democracies may thus be aﬄicted by a tyranny of the single-minded.
Our analysis suggests that U.S. congressmen’s choices on secondary issues may often
diverge from what the majority of American citizens want. As stressed in the intro-
duction, a clear example of this gap is the failure of the Senate to pass even mild gun
regulations, which are supported by the overwhelming majority of the electorate. One
might expect to see policy outcomes that reflect the preferences of the median voter in
the sixteen U.S. states that allow for direct initiatives.16 However, there are at least
three reasons to believe that the outcome of such initiatives may not always coincide
with the preferences of the majority of voters. First, there may be a bias in terms of
which propositions end up on the ballot. This is because organizing initiatives is very
costly in terms of both time and money, and single-issue voters may be more willing to
incur such costs.17 Second, direct initiatives are likely to suffer from a bias in turnout,
16The direct initiative process allows ordinary citizens to draft a petition in the form of
a legislative bill or constitutional amendment. If the petition receives sufficient popular
support, the measure is then placed directly on a ballot, without the need to first submit
it to the legislature.
17Organizing an initiative is a complex legal process, involving several steps: 1) pre-
liminary filing of a proposed petition with a designated state official; 2) review of the
petition for conformance with statutory requirements and, in several states, a review of
the language of the proposal; 3) preparation of a ballot title and summary; 4) circulation
of the petition to obtain the required number of signatures of registered voters, usually
a percentage of the votes cast for a statewide office in the preceding general election;
and 5) submission of the petition to the state officials, who must verify the number
of signatures. Organizing a successful initiative is also financially very costly, since it
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if single-issue voters are more willing to incur the costs of voting (e.g. spending time to
register, rearranging work schedules, getting to the polls, and gathering information on
the candidates). Finally, initiatives often suffer from framing effects.18
An important avenue for future research is to understand how voters’ preference in-
tensity affects the role of lobby groups. The existing literature has emphasized various
channels through which lobbies may affect policy outcomes, e.g. by offering campaign
contributions to incumbent politicians (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), pledging the
votes of their members (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011), and making it easier for special
interests to have access to politicians and providing issue-specific information to politi-
cians (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Bertrand et al., 2014). Our results suggest that the
power of single-issue lobby groups rests in the intensity of their members’ preferences.19
These organizations can play a key role, allowing single-issue voters to keep politicians
accountable: they provide information to their members about politicians’ choices on
their key issue of interest; and they remind politicians that their members are willing to
cast their votes based on this issue alone.
usually requires hiring specialized firms to run opinion polls before drafting the petition
and to collect the required number of signatures.
18See “Gun safety versus gun control,” The Economist, January 24, 2013.
19This is, for example, what was argued about the NRA in a recent article on the New
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Table 1: The impact of election proximity on votes on gun regulations, party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit 0.071* 0.072* 0.070* 0.085** 0.103** 0.103** 0.099**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Senate3it× Republicanit 0.460*** 0.457*** 0.456*** 0.460*** 0.395*** 0.386*** 0.382***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.066) (0.110) (0.117) (0.117)
Senate12it× Republicanit 0.430*** 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.434*** 0.363*** 0.359*** 0.356***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.063) (0.110) (0.116) (0.116)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460
R-squared 0.591 0.594 0.645 0.694 0.218 0.226 0.341
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.101 0.134 0.136 0.324 0.158 0.254 0.254
Senate12it× Republicanit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the state level
in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro gun
on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. The last row reports the p-value of
the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 2: The impact of election proximity on votes on environmental regulations, party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.366*** -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.374*** -0.246*** -0.243*** -0.245***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.388*** -0.391*** -0.392*** -0.391*** -0.260*** -0.256*** -0.259***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.061) (0.064) (0.063)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277 37,277
R-squared 0.360 0.361 0.423 0.437 0.022 0.022 0.125
Test Senate3it× Republicanit 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.076 0.083 0.085 0.074
= Senate12it× Republicanit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the state level in
columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment
on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. The last row reports the p-value of the
test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 3: The impact of election proximity on votes on reproductive rights, party differences
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Democratit -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.033 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Senate3it× Republicanit -0.735*** -0.737*** -0.737*** -0.743*** -0.055 -0.055 -0.059
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068)
Senate12it× Republicanit -0.737*** -0.738*** -0.738*** -0.738*** -0.049 -0.049 -0.052
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995 4,995
R-squared 0.730 0.731 0.747 0.770 0.020 0.020 0.098
Test Senate3it× Republicanit = 0.888 0.939 0.957 0.721 0.574 0.574 0.559
Senate12it× Republicanit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the state
level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted
pro choice on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1997-2012. The last row reports
the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 4: The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations, retiring
senators
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.095** 0.094** 0.094** 0.081* 0.116** 0.120*** 0.119***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.156 -0.175 -0.174 0.017 -0.121 -0.198 -0.196
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.041) (0.253) (0.242) (0.243)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.013 -0.061 -0.059 -0.073 -0.056 -0.078 -0.075
(0.095) (0.090) (0.091) (0.058) (0.189) (0.182) (0.182)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725
R-squared 0.529 0.539 0.556 0.729 0.286 0.317 0.346
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.256 0.377 0.378 0.091 0.708 0.487 0.484
Senate12it× Retiringit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the
state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from
state j voted pro gun on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1994-2012.
The last row reports the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 5: The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
retiring senators
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× Not Retiringit 0.026*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.022* 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Senate3it× Retiringit -0.027 -0.024 -0.021 0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.047) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Senate12it× Retiringit -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 0.010 -0.017 -0.016 -0.018
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514 17,514
R-squared 0.258 0.260 0.396 0.354 0.039 0.039 0.223
Test Senate3it× Retiringit = 0.875 0.989 0.860 0.815 0.504 0.476 0.399
Senate12it× Retiringit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the
state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state
j voted pro environment on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1971-2012.
The last row reports the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 6: The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations, safe
seat senators
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× No Safe Seatit 0.091** 0.087** 0.087** 0.099** 0.122** 0.121** 0.120**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Senate3it× Safe Seatit 0.068 0.087 0.085 0.207 0.022 0.052 0.049
(0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.187) (0.093) (0.090) (0.090)
Senate12it× Safe Seatit 0.052 0.045 0.042 0.204 -0.009 0.030 0.026
(0.076) (0.072) (0.071) (0.133) (0.098) (0.093) (0.093)
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 704 704 704 704 704 704 704
R-squared 0.519 0.528 0.546 0.728 0.286 0.314 0.344
Test Senate3it× Safe Seatit = 0.854 0.653 0.635 0.988 0.653 0.766 0.755
Senate12it× Safe Seatit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at
the state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator
i from state j voted pro gun on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period
1994-2012. The last row reports the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 7: The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental regulations,
safe seats senators
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Senate3it× No Safe Seatit 0.024** 0.025*** 0.025** 0.020 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Senate3it× Safe Seatit 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.013 0.005 0.006 0.007
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Senate12it× Safe Seatit 0.020 0.023 0.023 0.012 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.035) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Senator controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
State controls no yes yes yes no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes yes no no no
Vote dummies no no yes no no no yes
State × Year dummies no no no yes no no no
Senator dummies no no no no yes yes yes
Observations 17,419 17,419 17,419 17,419 17,419 17,419 17,419
R-squared 0.260 0.261 0.396 0.355 0.039 0.039 0.222
Test Senate3it× Safe Seatit = 0.382 0.443 0.451 0.942 0.708 0.676 0.666
Senate12it× Safe Seatit
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the
state level in columns 1-4 and senator level in columns 5-7. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state
j voted pro environment on vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1971-2012.
The last row reports the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 8: The impact of election proximity on Democrats voting on gun regulations, by
size of the pro-gun minority
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.137 -0.135 -0.134
(0.138) (0.141) (0.142)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.047* 0.049* 0.049*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Senate3it× Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gun Magazine Subscriptionsjt 0.129** 0.141** 0.142**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062)
Gun Magazine Subscriptions2jt -0.003** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
State controls no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 725 725 725
R-squared 0.529 0.540 0.557
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions 0.033 0.022 0.022
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro gun on vote v
in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1994-2012. The last row reports the
p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Table 9: The impact of election proximity on Republicans voting on environmental
regulations, by size of the green minority
Dep. variable: Voteijvt
(1) (2) (3)
Senate3it -0.057* -0.056* -0.061*
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizationsj 0.145** 0.142** 0.157**
(0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
Senate3it× Membership in Green Organizations2j -0.050* -0.049 -0.057*
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031)
State controls no yes yes
Year dummies yes yes no
State dummies yes yes yes
Vote dummies no no yes
Observations 16,855 16,855 16,855
R-squared 0.259 0.260 0.394
Joint test for Senate3it and interactions 0.008 0.010 0.009
The table reports coefficients of a linear probability model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering
at the state level. The dependent variable Voteijvt is coded as 1 when senator i from state j voted pro environment on
vote v in year t. All specifications include senator controls. The sample covers the period 1971-2012. The last row reports
the p-value of the test. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
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